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“Snowed In” in Russia: A Historical Analysis of 
American and Russian Extradition and How the 
Snowden Saga Might Impact the Future 
William C. Herrington

 
With the Russian Federation’s (Russia) decision to grant Edward 
Snowden
1
 temporary asylum for one year,
2
 a dark shadow has been 
cast over the future relationship between Russia and the United 
States.
3
 In the wake of Russia’s decision to give Snowden temporary 
asylum, relations between the two countries have deteriorated 
quickly.
4
 In September 2013, shortly after Russia granted Snowden 
 
 
 J.D. (2015), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2012), Saint Louis 
University. Thank you to my family and friends, especially those of you on Journal, whose 
work made this Note publishable. And a special thanks to my parents and role models, Walter 
and Donna Herrington, for without them, I would not be the person am I today. I love and thank 
you both.  
 1. Edward Snowden is an American citizen “charged with theft, ‘unauthorized 
communication of national defense information’ and ‘willful communication of classified 
communications intelligence information to an unauthorized person,’ according to the 
[criminal] complaint” filed by federal prosecutors; the latter two charges were filed pursuant to 
the Espionage Act of 1917. Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, 
WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-
charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story. 
html. 
 2. Isabel Gorst, Russia Gives Edward Snowden Asylum for Three More Years, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014, 10:37AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-snowden-
asylum-20140807-story.html. 
 3. The author wishes to clarify that, in this Note, he takes no stance on whether Edward 
Snowden’s actions are criminal or heroic. For a discussion on whether Snowden’s actions are 
heroic or traitorous, compare John Cassidy, Why Edward Snowden is a Hero, NEW YORKER 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/06/ why-edward-
snowden-is-a-hero.html, with Jeffery Toobin, Edward Snowden is No Hero, NEW YORKER 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/edward-snowden-
nsa-leaker-is-no-hero.html. 
 4. This is not solely because of Russia’s decision to grant Snowden asylum. Over the last 
few years, Russia and the United States have had differing opinions on Syria’s government, as 
Russia continues to support the Bashar al-Assad regime that has been accused of using 
chemical weapons against its citizens. Hayes Brown, 4 Issues Chilling U.S.-Russian Relations 
As Winter Olympics Begin in Sochi, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 7, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://think 
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temporary asylum, President Obama cancelled a meeting that was to 
take place in Russia.
5
 American politicians called for a boycott of the 
2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.
6
 The chilling effect that the 
temporary asylum caused harkens back to the relationship between 
the United States and Russia during, and after, the Cold War. 
Part I of this Note will begin by providing a broad survey of the 
history of extradition agreements. Part II will engage in a historical 
analysis of American-Russian extradition agreements, followed by 
Snowden’s story in Part III. Part IV will offer an example of what a 
hypothetical American-Russian extradition treaty would look like and 
will discuss whether or not the proposed treaty, if enacted prior to 
Snowden seeking asylum, would have altered Russia’s decision to 
grant him temporary asylum. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXTRADITION TREATIES 
The concept of extradition—in which one country sends a wanted 
fugitive back to the country seeking the fugitive—is not a recent 
development.
7
 The ancient Egyptians and Hittites entered into the 
first known extradition agreement in 1258 B.C.
8
 Further, ancient 
 
progress.org/world/2014/02/07/3263471/4-issues-chilling-russia-america/. Moreover, soon after 
President Obama announced his plans for American military action in Syria, Russian President 
“Vladimir Putin warned the United States against launching military action in Syria, stating that 
Russian has ‘plans’ on how it would react if such a scenario unfolded.” Dan Roberts, Spencer 
Ackerman, Haroon Siddique, & Angelique Chrisafis, ‘We Have Our Plans’: Vladimir Putin 
Warns US Against Syria Military Action, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2013, 06:55 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/04/putin-warns-military-action-syria. Further, Russia 
recently adopted a law forbidding the promotion of gay rights, much to the disapproval of 
Americans and human rights activists internationally. Id.  
 5. Bruce Zagaris, Russia Grants Snowden Temporary Asylum, Frustrating U.S. 
Extradition Efforts, 29 NO. 10 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 372 (2013) [hereinafter Zagaris, 
Frustrating U.S. Extradition]. 
 6. Tanya Domi, Send Athletes to the Sochi Olympics, but Boycott the Games, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/06/when-should-
countries-boycott-the-olympics/send-athletes-to-the-sochi-olympics-but-boycott-the-games 
(“[S]ome Western political leaders, including President Obama, came together in a so-
called political boycott, choosing to support the participating athletes but to stay home and 
effectively snub President Vladimir V. Putin at the opening ceremonies, in effect undercutting 
Putin’s pinnacle moment of nationalistic glory.”). 
 7. William Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 839, 846 (2013). 
 8. Id. An extradition agreement was embedded into a peace treaty between Rameses II, 
pharaoh of Egypt, and Hattusili III, prince of the Hittites. Id. The treaty stated that criminals 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/16
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Greeks and Roman city states used extradition agreements, which 
relied on the concept of noxae deditio.
9
 Noxae deditio held that “[a] 
state that harbored a foreign criminal was considered to be poisoned 
or tainted by the presence of that individual, and could be held liable 
for that criminal’s actions.”10 However, “Greek and Roman values 
concerning hospitality and the protection of guests coincided with a 
strongly-held belief that the gods favored the granting of asylum.”11 
Despite an extensive history, modern forms of extradition 
agreements began taking form in the 1800s.
12
 Whereas earlier 
extradition agreements focused primarily on crimes of a political 
nature,
13
 extradition agreements, beginning around the early 1800s, 
focused primarily on common offenses, such as torts and regular 
crimes.
14
 This shift can be attributed to the history of European 
democracies and the United States as “the product[s] of revolution 
and thus, [these new democracies] strongly opposed the extradition of 
political offenders and refugees.”15 Advocacy for the protection of 
political offenders and refugees influenced political essays of the 
 
fleeing from one empire to the other “would not be sheltered by the receiving king, but rather, 
would be delivered up to the proper authorities in the country from which they fled.” Id. at n.31. 
 9. Id. at 846–47. The Roman law of noxae deditio held that a father or master would be 
responsible for the crimes of his child or slave if the father or master could not find the guilty 
individual. Id. at 847. 
 10. Id. at 847. 
 11. Id. at n.32; see also 1 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM 
OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 349 (1911) (“The right of asylum occupied a prominent place 
in the religious, in the political, and in the legal history of antiquity. Commanded by the gods 
who zealously punished all infractions of this obligation, it was in a sense above the common 
law . . .”). 
 12. Christine E. Cervasio, Note, Extradition and the International Criminal Court: The 
Future of the Political Offense Doctrine, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 419, 422 (1999); see also 
Magnuson, supra note 7, at 848 (“By the nineteenth century, what we might consider the 
modern extradition began to take shape… This was a very different kind of treaty from previous 
ones, for it dealt with the problem of regular crimes and torts rather than political offenses.”). 
 13. Cervasio, supra note 12, at 421. 
 14. Magnuson, supra note 7, at 848–49. It is noteworthy that the Industrial Revolution 
coincides with the changing philosophy on what offenses should be covered by an extradition 
treaty. Id. at 852. With the advancements in transportation, “[s]uddenly, national borders were 
hours, rather than days, distant. As a consequence of the new technologies, ‘the conviction was 
forced upon the States of [civilized] humanity that it was in their common interest to surrender 
ordinary criminals regularly to each other.’” Id. (quoting 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 697 (8th ed. 1955)). 
 15. See Cervasio, supra note 12, at 422.  
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time
16
 and even the Declaration of Independence.
17
 Eventually, the 
notion of extraditing a fugitive for committing offenses of a political 
nature became less common in many countries;
18
 this perspective was 
first explicitly stated in Belgium’s statutory code.19 Now, most 
modern extradition agreements contain a provision known as the 
“Political Offense” exception,20 which specifically provides 
protections to individuals wanted for offenses of a political nature.
21
 
 
 16. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (London, Thomas 
Tegg, W. Sharpe & Son 1823); Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010) (last updated July 29, 2010), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#SepPowDisGov (“[I]f the rule of law is ignored, if the 
representatives of the people are prevented from assembling, if the mechanisms of election are 
altered without popular consent, or if the people are handed over to a foreign power, then they 
can take back their original authority and overthrow the government. They can also rebel if the 
government attempts to take away their rights.”); see also DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
MAN AND CITIZEN art. II (Fr. 1789) (“The aim of all political association is the preservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression.”). 
 17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to 
be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government 
. . .”). 
 18. See Magnuson, supra note 7, at 851. 
 19. David M. Lieberman, Note, Sorting the Revolutionary from the Terrorist: The 
Delicate Application of the “Political Offense” Exception in U.S. Extradition Cases, STAN. L. 
REV. 181, 187 (2006). The Belgian statutory language stated, “It shall be expressly stipulated in 
[extradition] agreements that no foreigner may be prosecuted or punished for any political 
crime antecedent to the extradition, or for any act connected with such a crime. . . .” Id. (citing 
Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 362–63 (Supp. 1935) 
(quoting OFFICIAL BULLETIN (Belg.), No. 77 (1833) (unofficial translation)). 
 20. See Lieberman, supra note 19, at 187. Soon after Belgium codified their political 
offender exception, many other countries followed suit, including the United States in an 
extradition treaty with France in 1843. Id. 
 21. There are two classifications of political offenses. See Cervasio, supra note 12, at 426. 
Pure political offenses are acts “directed solely against the political order. . . .” Id. (quoting 
IVAN SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181–82 (1971))). “This category of 
offenses is limited to treason, espionage, and sedition. Pure political offenses are rarely 
extraditable crimes. Relative political offenses are common crimes, such as murder or theft, 
which are connected with a political act. These offenses may qualify for 
the political offense exception.” Michael R. Littenberg, Note, The Political Offense Exception: 
An Historical Analysis and Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (1990). 
“Relative political offenses can be broken into two sub-categories. Délit complexe are those 
acts ‘directed at both the political order and private rights.’ Délit connexe is ‘in itself not an act 
directed against the political order, but which is closely connected with another act which is so 
directed.’” Cervasio, supra note 12, at 426.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/16
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The Political Offense exception exists as a result of the concern 
that an individual would be subjected to an unfair trial or inhumane 
treatment if extradited to the requesting State for committing a 
political offense.
22
 “Despite such concerns, many countries have 
adopted a rule of non-inquiry, under which courts may not examine 
the requesting country’s justice system or human rights record in 
determining whether to extradite an individual.”23 The rule of non-
inquiry, thus, is implemented out of respect for and as a courtesy to 
the requesting nation.
24
 The United States Supreme Court adopted a 
position of non-inquiry in Neely v. Henkel,
25
 which held that “[w]hen 
an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot 
complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such 
punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own 
people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations 
between that country and the United States.”26 
Further, many nations will not extradite an individual if the 
alleged action fails the dual criminality requirement—that the alleged 
offense be criminal in both the requesting and receiving nation.
27
  
 
 22. Cervasio, supra note 12, at 420. 
 23. Magnuson, supra note 7, at 886. 
 24. David B. Sullivan, Note, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International 
Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 119 (1991) (stating that “[t]he rationale 
for the rule of non-inquiry is that it is not the courts’ business to assume responsibility for 
supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such a role would 
directly conflict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based.”). 
 25. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
 26. Id. at 123. This sentiment was reiterated in the 2008 Supreme Court case Munaf v. 
Geren, where the Court held that “it is for the political branches, not the Judiciary, to assess 
practices in foreign countries and to determine national policy in light of those assessments. 553 
U.S. 674, 700–01 (2008). 
 27. Jonathan Hafen, Note, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual 
Criminality Requirement, Jonathan Hafen, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 191, 191 (1992). 
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II. AMERICAN-RUSSIAN EXTRADITION HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE 
SNOWDEN SAGA 
A. The 1893 Extradition Treaty 
In 1893, the United States and tsarist Russia entered into the first 
extradition treaty between the two sovereignties.
28
 This treaty 
included a political offense clause,
29
 but it created an exception to 
that clause for individuals that took “an attempt against the life of the 
head of either Government . . . .”30 However, “[t]hat extradition treaty 
is now long forgotten and the United States and Russia have no 
formal agreement.”31  
The exact moment that the 1893 extradition treaty lost its validity 
has been debated.
32
 There are compelling arguments on both sides of 
this argument. In 2007, an advisor to Russia’s prosecutor general 
argued for the validity of the 1893 extradition treaty,
33
 as the treaty 
specifically states that it “shall remain in force for six months after 
notice of its termination shall have been given by either of the 
contracting parties,”34 and since no notice of termination has been 
given, the advisor argued that the 1893 extradition treaty was still 
valid. However, multiple changes in government have led others to 
conclude that the 1893 treaty lost its validity when the Bolshevik 
 
 28. Eyder Peralta, 3 Extradition Cases That Help Explain U.S.-Russia Relations, NPR 
(Aug. 7, 2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/07/209846990/3-
extradition-cases-that-help-explain-u-s-russia-relations.  
 29. T.F. Bayard, C. Struve, & Rosen, Text of the Russian Extradition Treaty, 55 
AMERICAN ADVOCATE OF PEACE 7, 148–49 (1893). The treaty stipulated that “[i]f it be made to 
appear that extradition is sought with a view to try or punish the person demanded for an 
offence of a political character, surrender shall not take place. . . .” Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Peralta, supra note 28.  
 32. Id. While US officials have long thought the 1893 treaty to be invalid, there appears to 
have been no formal cancellation. See Carl Schreck, From Tsar to Snowden, US-Russian 
Extradition Deal Saw Quiet Demise, RIA NOVOSTI (June 29, 2013, 1:29PM), http://en.ria.ru/ 
world/20130629/181944016/Tsar-Alexander-to-Snowden-US-Russian-Extradition-Deal-Treaty-
Saw-Demise.html. This question was taken up in 1947 when the United States was asked to 
extradite Kirill Alekseev, a Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States after leaving his 
post in Mexico. Id. “State Department officials were unsure whether the two countries had an 
extradition treaty under which [Alekseev] could be transferred to the Soviets.” Id. 
 33. Schreck, supra note 32. 
 34. Bayard, supra note 29, at 149. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/16
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Revolution took place in 1917.
35
 Further, the United States, as early 
as 1941, suggested that they did not view the 1893 extradition treaty 
as being binding.
36
  
While there is no currently recognized extradition treaty between 
the two countries, the United States has actively deported Russian 
criminals back to Russia.
37
 However, there have been a handful of 
high-profile Russian extradition requests that the United States has 
rejected.
38
 
B. High-Profile Extradition Requests
39
 
1. The Nazi War Criminals 
After the Second World War, the United States enacted the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA)
40
 to enable “European refugees 
driven from their homelands by World War II to emigrate to the 
United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas.”41 
The DPA’s “definition of ‘displaced persons’ eligible for 
immigration to [the United States] specifically excluded individuals 
 
 35. Schreck supra note 32. This argument is persuasive. The United States entered into 
the 1893 treaty with the tsarist Russian government, not the United Soviet States of Russia or 
the Russian Federation. Further, “the tsarist-era extradition treaty may have been scrapped by 
one or both of the sides in the wake of the Bolsheviks’ overthrow of the Tsar in 1917 and the 
Soviet renunciation of his foreign commitments.” Id. 
 36. Id. According to Schreck, a 1970 United Nations report indicates that the United 
States may have viewed the 1893 extradition treaty as obsolete in 1941 when they removed it 
from their books; a State Department report on America’s extradition obligations suggests the 
same. Id. However, Christopher Blakesley, a former State Department extradition attorney, 
argues that “cancellation of the treaty ‘clearly requires’ that it be done ‘through official 
channels, usually by diplomatic note.’” Id. 
 37. Id. From 2002 to 2011, the Department of Homeland Security deported 627 Russian 
criminals despite no obligation to follow an extradition treaty. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (Sept. 2012), Table 41, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb 
_2011.pdf. While deportation and extradition are not the same, the ideology behind sending 
criminals back to face trial in their home country is very similar to the aforementioned 
ideologies that led to the current development of extradition agreements. 
 38. See Peralta, supra note 28. 
 39. It should be noted that the author remains neutral on all of the following instances 
regarding extradition conflicts between the United States and Russia. 
 40. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80–774, 62 Stat. 1009 
(1948), amended by Pub. L. No. 81–555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950)). 
 41. Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 490, 490 (1981). 
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who had assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians or had 
voluntarily assisted the enemy forces in their operations.”42 However, 
Nazi war criminals willfully made misrepresentations to meet the 
definition of a “displaced person” under the statute and gained entry 
to the United States.
43
 Feodor Fedorenko and Karl Linnas are the 
only two men accused of war crimes that were deported from the 
United States to Soviet Russia.
44
 
Feodor Fedorenko served in the Russian Army in 1941, but was 
captured by German soldiers.
45
 While a prisoner-of-war, Fedorenko 
became an armed guard for the Nazis at their concentration camps.
46
 
In 1949, Fedorenko applied for entry to the United States claiming he 
was a ‘displaced person,’47 per the DPA, but he did not disclose that 
he worked as a concentration camp armed guard for the Nazis.
48
 
Fedorenko was subsequently granted a visa based on this 
misrepresentation.
49
 Ultimately, Fedorenko received full citizenship 
in 1970.
50
 The United States learned of Fedorenko’s 
misrepresentations in 1977, and they filed an action to revoke 
Fedorenko’s citizenship.51 Upon final adjudication of his case, 
Fedorenko was extradited to Russia in 1984 to stand trial for his 
involvement in committing war crimes per the request of the Russian 
government.
52
  
 
 42. Id. at 495 (internal quotations omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Felicity Barringer, Soviet Reports it Executed Nazi Guard U.S. Extradited, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/28/world/soviet-reports-it-executed-
nazi-guard-us-extradited.html. 
 45. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 496. 
 48. Id. at 496–97. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 497–98. 
 52. Soviets Sentence Fedorenko to Die for Nazi War Crimes: Was Extradited From U.S. 
to Face Charges, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-19/news/mn-
12363_1_nazi-war-crimes. Fedorenko was executed on July 28, 1987 after standing trial in 
Russia and receiving a death sentence. Barringer, supra note 44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/16
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Like Fedorenko, Karl Linnas entered the United States in 1951 
under false pretenses and obtained citizenship in 1960.
53
 On three 
occasions, the Soviets had requested that Linnas be extradited to 
Russia to stand trial for alleged war crimes.
54
 The US government 
initially rejected these extradition requests but, after learning of 
Linnas’ false pretenses in obtaining citizenship, began the process to 
deport him in 1979.
55
 Deporting Linnas proved to be problematic;
56
 
however, he was ultimately sent to Russia after much deliberation
57
 
and Supreme Court involvement.
58
 
2. Kirill Alekseev/Alexeyev 
In 1947, Kirill Alekseev was working in Mexico as a Soviet trade 
representative when he fled to the United States.
59
 Upon entering the 
United States, Alekseev harshly criticized Russia by stating that 
Russia was a “hell of dictatorship.”60 Russian officials called for the 
 
 53. Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986). Linnas told American officials 
that he was a university student during the World War II, when he was actually the head of a 
Nazi concentration camp in Tartu, Estonia. Id. 
 54. Peralta, supra note 28. See generally GINSBURGS, RUBENSTEIN, & SMOLANSKY, 
RUSSIA AND AMERICA: FROM RIVALRY TO RECONCILIATION (1993), for further discussion. The 
Soviets asserted that Linnas was responsible for war crimes at the Tartu concentration camp. 
Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1026. They held a war crimes tribunal, tried Linnas in absentia, and found 
him guilty. Id. 
 55. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1026. 
 56. Id. at 1027. Linnas had requested deportation to Estonia, his home country; however, 
since Estonia was incorporated into Soviet Russia at the end of the Second World War, Estonia 
technically became a part of Soviet Russia. Id. Because the United States had not recognized 
the Soviet Union’s annexation of Estonia, the immigration judges handling Linnas’ case needed 
a statutory basis for sending Linnas to Russia. Id. at 1027. 
 57. Immigration judges may deport to any country if the country falls within one of seven 
categories. Id. at 1027–28. The Second Circuit determined Soviet Russia fell within two of the 
seven categories: first, deportation to the country where the individual’s birthplace is located at 
the time of deportation, and, second, if deportation under any of the other categories is 
impossible, deportation is valid to any country that will accept the individual. See id. Because 
that Russia was the only country willing to accept Linnas post-deportation, and Russia had 
annexed Estonia, Linnas’ place of birth, the judges found a statutory basis for deporting Linnas 
to Russia.  
 58. On July 2, 1987, Linnas died in a Leningrad hospital prior to receiving his death 
sentence. Deported Nazi Linnas Dies in Soviet Hospital, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 1987), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-07-02/news/mn-1932_1_nazi-linnas. 
 59. Peralta, supra note 28. 
 60. See Russia Seeks to Enlist U.S. Help to Return Citizen, THE TIMES RECORD, Jan. 6, 
1947, at 7, http://fultonhistory.com/Newspaper%2018/Troy%20NY%20Times%20Record/ 
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United States to extradite Alekseev, alleging Alekseev was guilty of 
“embezzlement, treachery, treason, provocation, and slander. . . .”61 
In response to Russia’s extradition request for Alekseev, “the State 
Department informed the Soviets that no extradition treaty exists 
between the two countries and that it is therefore unable to grant 
Moscow’s request that [Alekseev] be turned over to Soviet 
authorities.”62 
3. Ilyas Akhmadov, the Chechen “Terrorist” 
Ilyas Akhmadov is one of Russia’s most wanted fugitives.63 While 
acting as Chechnya’s Foreign Minister, Akhmadov left Chechnya in 
1999 to bring awareness to the Chechen push for independence from 
Russia.
64
 Akhmadov sought asylum in the United States in 2002.
65
 
Upon learning of Akhmadov’s application for asylum, Russia called 
for extradition of Akhmadov so he could stand trial for crimes 
 
Troy%20NY%20Times%20Record%201947/Troy%20NY%20Times%20Record%201947%20
-%200067.pdf. The article states that Alekseev would not “return [to] [his] homeland and doom 
[his] family, which has become accustomed to breathe the fresh air of freedom, to a life under 
the hell of dictatorship.” Id. 
 61. Peralta, supra note 28. 
 62. Schreck, supra note 32 (internal quotations omitted). 
 63. Aaron Klein, U.S. Gave Asylum to Accused Chechen Terror Leader. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski Assisted Man on Russia’s Most Wanted List, KLEIN ONLINE (Apr. 30, 2013, 
2:12AM), http://kleinonline.wnd.com/2013/04/30/u-s-gave-asylum-to-accused-chechen-terror-
leader-zbigniew-brzezinski-assisted-man-on-russias-most-wanted-list/. When the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics disbanded, the Chechens declared independence in 1991, and, after 
years of military conflict, Russia left the region in 1996. Chechnya Profile, BBC NEWS (last 
updated on Nov. 12, 2013, 11:11AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18188085. In 
1999, Russian troops again entered Chechnya and claimed it succeeded in obtaining control of 
the independent sovereignty. Id.  
 64. Matthew Brzezinski, How a Chechen Terror Suspect Wound up Living on Taxpayers’ 
Dollar near the National Zoo, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/articles/A38200-2005Mar15_4.html. Chechnya, located in the North Caucasus, has 
long had a tense and sometimes violent relationship with Russia, dating back to the mid-1800s 
when Russia conquered the Chechens. Timeline: Chechnya, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm.  After the Soviet Union 
fell in 1991, Chechnya overthrew its communist government and proclaimed itself as an 
independent nation.  Id.  Ever since, Russia has fought to regain control of Chechnya, which has 
led to years of bloodshed.  Id. 
 65. Brzenzinksi, supra note 64. 
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committed against the Kremlin.
66
 The request was dismissed after the 
immigration judge handling Akhmadov’s asylum application 
determined the evidence of Akhmadov’s involvement in terrorist 
activity as insufficient.
67
 In 2004, the United States granted 
Akhmadov’s asylum application.68 Russia has vehemently opposed 
the decision, stating that Akhmadov is a terrorist and “accused the 
U.S. of hypocrisy for granting Akhmadov asylum.”69 In fact, the 
Russians brought up Akhmadov’s asylum during discussions of 
Edward Snowden’s request for extradition.70 
4. The Viktor Bout Bout 
Viktor Bout is a Russian national and an alleged international 
arms dealer.
71
 On March 6, 2008, he was arrested in Thailand 
pursuant to a sting operation conducted by the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
72
 The DEA targeted Bout 
because of his involvement in arms trafficking to the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a group dedicated to 
overthrowing the Colombian democratic government and a leading 
international supplier of cocaine.
73
 The United States has an 
extradition treaty with Thailand
74
 and requested that Bout be 
 
 66. Id. Russian prosecutors and the Russian branch of Interpol objected to Akhmadov’s 
asylum application, claiming that Akhmadov had been “charged with organizing terrorist 
training camps, and leading 2,000 armed insurgents . . . .” in the 1999 Second Chechen War. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. While Russian media describes Akhmadov as a terrorist, his actions in the West 
have shown him to be nothing more than an advocate for peaceful resolution between the 
warring Chechens and Russian Federation. See Editorial, A Good Decision, WASH. POST  (Aug. 
10, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52978-2004Aug9.html (“More to 
the point, Mr. Akhmadov is well known for denouncing terrorism, for opposing the use of 
suicide bombs and for working, as he puts it, for a ‘negotiated peace’ in his country.”). 
 69. Klein, supra note 63. Further, Putin stated, “We cannot have double standards while 
fighting terrorism, and it cannot be used as a geopolitical game.” Id. 
 70. David M. Herszenhorn, Russia Cites Extradition as Sore Point with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
(July 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/europe/russia-cites-extradition-as-
sore-point-with-us.html?_r=0. 
 71. U.S. v. Bout, 731 F.3d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 72. Id. at 236–37. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Treaty of Extradition, U.S.-Thailand, Mar. 24, 1924, 43 Stat. 1749.  
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extradited to the United States to stand trial.
75
 He was extradited to 
the United States on November 16, 2010 and stood for trial on 
October 11, 2011.
76
 
At trial before the Southern District of New York, a jury found 
Bout guilty on all counts,
77
 and he was sentenced to twenty-five years 
in prison.
78
 Russian officials requested that Bout be transferred to 
Moscow to serve his sentence pursuant to the 1983 Convention on 
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,
79
 but this request was denied, 
much to Russia’s dismay.80 The United States, however, has 
proffered legitimate reasons for denying Russia’s request.81 At this 
time, Bout remains incarcerated in the United States.
82
 
 
 75. Bout, 731 F.3d at 237. This request was originally rejected but was eventually granted. 
Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. Bout maintains his innocence and consistently denies the allegations brought 
against him. RAPSI, Russia disappointed with US refusal to extradite Viktor Bout, THE 
MOSCOW NEWS (Nov. 11, 2012, 10:32AM), http://themoscownews.com/international/ 
20121112/190843165.html. 
 78. Bout, 731 F.3d at 237. The Magnuson article presents commentary on the interests of 
third party countries in bilateral extradition agreements, especially when the third party country 
has a citizen being extradited pursuant to a bilateral treaty in which it is not a member. 
Magnuson, supra note 7, at 874 (“Russia's response to Bout's extradition demonstrates that it 
perceived an interest in the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States: It wanted 
to ensure that the treaty gave adequate protection to Russian citizens.”). 
 79. The 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons says, inter alia, that “[a] 
person sentenced in the territory of a Party may be transferred to the territory of another Party, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, in order to serve the sentence imposed on 
him.” Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, art. 2, March 21, 1983, CETS 167, 
21.III. 1983, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/112.htm. Both the 
United States and Russia are members of the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons. Council of Europe, Signatures on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, (last updated 
Feb. 2, 2014) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=112&CM=&DF 
=&CL=ENG.  
 80. RAPSI, supra note 77. 
 81. The 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons dictates that transfer may 
occur only if the following conditions are met: (1) the person is a citizen of the State requesting 
transfer; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the sentenced person has at least six months left to serve; 
(4) the sentenced person must consent to the transfer; (5) the sentenced actions are criminal 
offenses in both States; and (6) the State currently incarcerating the sentenced person agrees to 
the transfer. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 79, art. 3. The US 
Department of Justice released the following statement to explain why they denied Russia’s 
request: “The United States denied the transfer application because the prisoner has a pending 
appeal, because of the seriousness of the offence, because of serious law enforcement concerns 
and because the prisoner is a poor candidate due to his criminal history.” RAPSI, supra note 77. 
 82. Damir Sagolj, US rejects Russia’s extradition request for jailed businessman Bout, 
REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2012, 2:50PM), http://rt.com/news/viktor-bout-extradition-rejected-392/. 
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III. THE EDWARD SNOWDEN SAGA 
Edward Snowden is a former employee of Booz Allen Hamilton 
(Booz), a firm that gets most “of its revenue from government 
contracts.”83 While at Booz, Snowden did contract work for the 
National Security Agency
84
 (NSA), which “granted [him] access to 
lists of machines all over the world the NSA hacked.”85 On May 20, 
2013, Snowden
86
 left the United States for Hong Kong,
87
 taking 
secret documents with him containing information about certain NSA 
surveillance operations.
88
 Soon thereafter, Snowden began leaking 
these documents to The Guardian and The Washington Post, who 
published a series of articles revealing some of these NSA 
operations.
89
 One revelation uncovered by the reporting alleged that 
the NSA had been given the authority to spy on foreign 
governments.
90
 Another revelation alleged that the NSA had been 
 
 83. Brett Logiurato, REPORT: Edward Snowden Took a Job with Booz Allen to Gather 
Evidence on NSA Surveillance Programs, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 24, 2013, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/edward-snowden-booz-allen-nsa-surveillance-evidence-job-2013-
6. 
 84. Carol D. Leonnig, Jenna Johnson, & Marc Fisher, Tracking Edward Snowden, from 
Classroom to a Hong Kong Hotel, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/tracking-edward-snowden-from-a-maryland-classroom-to-a-hong-
kong-hotel/2013/06/15/420aedd8-d44d-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html. 
 85. Logiurato, supra note 83. 
 86. Barton Gellman & Jerry Markon, Edward Snowden says motive behind leaks was to 
expose ‘surveillance state,’ WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/edward-snowden-says-motive-behind-leaks-was-to-expose-surveillance-state/2013/06/09/ 
aa3f0804-d13b-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html. He was stationed in Hawaii prior to 
leaving for Hong Kong. Id. 
 87. Bruce Zagaris, The Snowden Extradition Saga, 29 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 324 
(2013) [hereinafter Zaragis, Saga]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, Court gave NSA Broad Leeway in Surveillance, 
Documents Show, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/court-gave-nsa-broad-leeway-in-surveillance-documents-show/2014/06/30/32 
b872ec-fae4-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html; see also Debbie Sharnak, U.S. Relations with 
South America Slow to Heal after NSA Spying, IVN (Dec. 9, 2014) http://ivn.us/2014/ 12/09/u-
s-relations-south-american-countries-slow-heal-nsa-spying/ (stating that documents leaked by 
Snowden prove that the NSA spied on Brazil’s president); see also James Ball, NSA Monitored 
Calls of 35 World Leaders after US Official Handed over Contacts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 
2013, 2:50 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-
calls (stating that US-German relations have deteriorated in wake of the NSA surveillance 
scandal). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
334 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:321 
 
 
performing “warrantless searches on Americans’ [telephone and 
email] communications.”91 
US authorities learned of Snowden’s actions soon after,92 and on, 
or around, June 21, 2013, the United States submitted an extradition 
request to Hong Kong and filed a criminal complaint against 
Snowden, alleging theft and espionage.
93
 Hong Kong notified the 
United States that they found the submitted evidence insufficient and 
requested more information about the complaint and evidence.
94
 
However, by the time that US authorities received Hong Kong’s 
request, Snowden had already departed Hong Kong for Russia.
95
 He 
arrived at Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow on June 23, 2013.
96
 For 
the next five and a half weeks,
97
 Snowden did not leave the 
international terminal’s “transit zone.”98 
Snowden’s decision to remain in the transit zone for that time can 
be explained by three reasons. First, at some point prior to his arrival 
in Moscow, the United States revoked his passport, so Snowden 
could not have cleared the passport control station at Sheremetyevo 
Airport.
99
 Second, “transit zones” are considered to be limbo spaces 
“where the standard protections of domestic and international law do 
not apply.”100 “Third, it appeared as though Snowden’s travel to 
 
 91. Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, NSA Performed Warrantless Searches on 
Americans’ Calls and Emails—Clapper, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data. 
 92. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 93. Id. The criminal complaint alleged “theft of government property, unauthorized 
disclosure of national defense information and unauthorized disclosure of classified 
communication intelligence.” Id.; see also Edward Snowden: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 
2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23768248 [hereinafter BBC 
Timeline]. 
 94. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 95. Id.; see also Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files—Timeline, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-
nsa-files-timeline [hereinafter Guardian Timeline]. 
 96. Andrei Soldatov, Russian Hospitality: Why Snowden Picked Moscow as His Transit 
Point, TIME (June 24, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/06/23/russian-hospitality-why-
snowden-picked-moscow-as-his-transit-point/. 
 97. Russia gave Snowden temporary asylum on August 1, 2013. See Gorst, supra note 2.  
 98. Zagaris, Frustrating U.S. Extradition, supra note 5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Ayelet Schacar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. 
& CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 188. “This means that if a person is caught after disembarking a flight 
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Moscow was just a waypoint in his travels, with his ultimate 
destination likely being Ecuador.
101
 
On July 1, 2013, Snowden applied for asylum in Russia but 
withdrew his application the next day.
102
 He reapplied for asylum in 
Russia on July 12, 2013.
103
 On August 1, 2013, Russia granted 
Snowden temporary asylum.
104
 Russian officials changed their 
position about Snowden’s asylum requests in part due to international 
events that occurred during the period between July 1st, when 
Russian officials discouraged Snowden from applying, and August 
1st, when Russia accepted his application. 
On July 1 and 2, 2013, Bolivian President Evo Morales attended a 
meeting in Russia regarding natural gas exportation.
105
 While in 
Russia, Morales told reporters that Bolivia would grant Snowden 
asylum if he applied.
106
 During Morales’ flight back to Bolivia, on 
July 3, 2013, his plane was denied entry to multiple European 
countries’ airspace, likely because these countries believed Snowden 
was a passenger on the flight.
107
 Morales was forced to land in 
 
but before reaching the first official [] border control checkpoint, that person has not ‘landed’ 
for immigration regulation purposes.” Id. 
 101. Soldatov, supra note 96. An interesting development in Snowden’s story is that Julian 
Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, has substantial connections with the Ecuadorean 
government. Id. The Ecuadorean government has housed Assange in their embassy in London 
since 2012. BBC Timeline, supra note 93. Further, it appears as though the Ecuadorean 
government assisted Snowden by providing him with an Ecuadorean travel document when his 
passport was revoked. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 102. BBC Timeline, supra note 93. “The Russian government discouraged his first request 
for asylum . . . and has portrayed itself as neutral.” Ellen Barry & Andrew Roth, Snowden 
Renews Plea for Moscow to Grant Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/07/13/world/europe/snowden-russia-asylum.html?pagewanted= all. 
 103. BBC Timeline, supra note 93.  
 104. Zagaris, Frustrating U.S. Extradition, supra note 5. 
 105. Bolivia awaits Russia’s Technology and Energy Investment—Morales to RT, RT (July 
3, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://rt.com/business/bolivia-morales-russia-energy-investments-599/. 
 106. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 107. Id. Given that Snowden withdrew his asylum application with Russia on July 1, 2013 
and that President Morales publically stated that Bolivia would grant Snowden asylum, it is 
likely that the United States believed Snowden withdrew his asylum application with Russia 
because he had been given asylum in Bolivia. See ‘Free from Imperial Persecution’: Three 
Latin American Countries Offer Shelter to Edward Snowden, RT (July 6, 2013, 1:15 PM), 
http://rt.com/news/maduro-snowden-asylum-venezuela-723/ (stating that “[w]hen the plane 
landed in Vienna to refuel, US Ambassador to Austria William Eacho phoned officials from the 
Austrian Foreign Ministry, the Austrian daily newspaper Die Presse reported. Eacho ”claimed 
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Vienna, Austria and spend the night there before he returned to 
Bolivia on July 4, 2013.
108
 By July 12, 2013, many other Latin 
American countries announced their support for Edward Snowden 
and offered him asylum.
109
 On the same day, Snowden announced 
that he would reapply for asylum in Russia,
110
 which was ultimately 
granted on August 1, 2013.
111
  
Russia’s decision to grant Snowden asylum quickly complicated 
relations between the United States and Russia. Just a month after 
Russia granted Snowden asylum, the United States and Russia were 
slated to have a summit in September of 2013;
112
 however, after 
Russia granted Snowden’s asylum request, US officials cancelled the 
summit.
113
 
Also, for the first time since the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the 
United States did not send a President, First Lady, Vice President, or 
former President to represent the United States at the Olympic 
Opening Ceremonies.
114
 Instead, the United States sent Billie Jean 
 
with great certainty that Edward Snowden was onboard” and referenced a ”diplomatic note 
requesting Snowden’s extradition.”). 
 108. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 109. On July 6, 2013, Venezuela and Nicaragua voiced their support for Snowden and 
offered him asylum. Id. Following “a meeting of Mercosur, whose members include Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Uruguay,” those countries “also called for ‘solidarity with 
the governments of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela,’ the three countries that have said they 
would offer Snowden asylum.” Juan Forero, Snowden Still Looks to Latin America for Asylum, 
WASH. POST (July 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/snowden-still-looks-to-
latin-america/2013/07/12/44de909a-eb37-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html. One could see 
this as Russia trying to ally with the aforementioned Latin American countries, harkening a 
parallel to their alliance with the Eastern Bloc countries of the Post-Second World War era. 
This might explain why Russian officials had a change of heart regarding their position on 
Snowden’s first and second asylum applications, after seeing South American countries offer 
Edward Snowden asylum. 
 110. Zagaris, Saga, supra note 87. 
 111. BBC Timeline, supra note 93; Zagaris, Frustrating U.S. Extradition, supra note 5. 
 112. Zagaris, Frustrating U.S. Extradition, supra note 5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Kelly Whiteside, Obama sends Message by Naming Sochi Olympics Delegation, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/sochi/2013/12/17/ 
white-house-sochi-olympics-delegation-to-include-gay-athlete/4051581/. “In London in 2012, 
Michelle Obama led a delegation that included Olympians Dominique Dawes, Brandi Chastain 
and others. In 2008, President Bush attended the Beijing Olympics. In 2002, President Bush 
also attended the opening ceremony for the Salt Lake City Winter Games, as is the custom for a 
head of state to attend a home Olympics. And former President George H.W. Bush was part of 
delegations to the 2008 and 2004 Games.” Id.  
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King, an openly gay former tennis star, Brian Boitano, an openly gay 
former figure skater, and Caitlin Cahow, an openly gay former ice 
hockey player, to represent the United States at the opening 
ceremony.
115
 Obama’s decision to include the aforementioned 
athletes in the US delegation was likely made to publically respond to 
the passage of a 2013 Russian law “that stigmatizes gay people and 
bans giving children any information about homosexuality.”116 
The two countries also have a recent history of enacting 
legislation aimed at sanctioning the other for perceived human rights 
abuses.
117
 In 2012, for example, the United States enacted the 
Magnitsky Act
118—a law penalizing Moscow and listing specific 
Russians who are barred from entering the United States for alleged 
human rights abuses against Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who 
fought against corruption in Russia and died, likely from torture, 
while imprisoned.
119
 In response, Russia passed a series of law that 
banned eighteen Americans from entering the country, obstructed 
Americans from adopting Russian children, and also “banned U.S. 
funding for any non-governmental organization deemed to be 
engaging in politics.”120 These sanctions, however, occurred prior to 
Snowden being granted asylum in August of 2013.  The United 
States, however, has placed other sanctions on Russia since Snowden 
received asylum there.  
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Russia Passes Anti-Gay-Law, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2011), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/russia-passes-anti-gay-law. 
 117. See Denis Dyomkin, Magnitsky Act, U.S. List of Alleged Russian Human Rights 
Abusers, Could Have ‘Very Negative Effect’ On Relations, Says Putin, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
Apr. 12, 2013 (June 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/12/ magnitsky-act-
putin_n_3067004.html. 
 118. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law 
Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112–208, 126 Stat. 1496 (2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Jim Heintz, Russia Responds to U.S. Magnitsky Act By Placing 18 Americans on 
Blacklist, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2013, last updated June 13, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/13/russia-responds-to-us-mag_n_3075795.html. Interestingly, 
included in Russia’s list of banned Americans were John Yoo, David Addington, retired Major 
General Geoffrey Miller, and Admiral Jeffrey Harbeson. Id. Those four aforementioned 
individuals were all connected in various aspects with the Guantanamo Bay detention center. Id. 
The Russians focused their retaliation on allegations of human rights abuses by the United 
States at Guantanamo Bay. Id. 
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In early 2014, Ukraine went through a period of civil unrest that 
resulted in the Ukrainian president fleeing the country and Pro-
Russian separatists take control of Simferopol, the capital city of the 
Crimea region of Ukraine.
121
 Soon after the Pro-Russian separatists 
seized control of Simferopol, President Putin sent Russian troops into 
Crimea and eventually signed a bill annexing Crimea into the Russian 
Federation.
122
 In response to Russia incorporating Crimea, the United 
States “imposed sanctions on more than two dozen Russian and 
Crimean officials . . . and have urged Russia to avoid escalating the 
crisis.”123 Russia officially kept its troops in Crimea until October 
2014, but, in November 2014, there was evidence that Russia sent 
troops back into Ukraine.
124
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Years of distrust and rivalry stemming from the Cold War have 
led to the current relationship between the two nations, and no one 
single gesture will completely change the course of time. Given the 
layers of tension that the Snowden saga has added to the relationship 
between the United States and Russia, there appears to be two 
potential paths that the two countries can take going forward.  
On one hand, the handling of the Snowden situation could 
represent nothing more than additional proof that the two nations 
cannot work together, leading to deeper entrenchment between these 
two nations and more disdain and distrust for the opposition. On the 
other hand, it could represent an opportunity for the two nations to 
lift themselves out of their deeply entrenched positions and begin a 
dialogue that will create a better relationship moving forward. 
 The second option does not seem likely for the following reasons. 
First, the United States acted quickly to distance itself from Russia by 
cancelling the 2013 summit. Although US officials cited many other 
 
 121. Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014, 3:16 PM). http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-middle-east-26248275.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Matt Smith & Alla Eshchenko, Ukraine Cries ‘Robbery’ as Rjsska Annexes Crimea, 
CNN (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/.  
 124. Ukraine Crisis: Russian Troops Crossed Border, Nato Says, BBC (Nov. 12, 2014, 
5:23 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30025138. 
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reasons for cancelling, it is not a coincidence that the Obama 
Administration decided to cancel the summit after Russia granted 
Snowden’s request for temporary asylum.125 Russian officials 
expressed disappointment with the decision to cancel the summit and 
suggested that the cancellation demonstrated that “the United States 
is still not ready to build relations on an equal basis.”126 These actions 
and remarks demonstrate that neither nation was ready to engage in 
conversation to mend their damaged relationship.  
Second, although the inclusion of prominent gay athletes in the 
US Delegation at the Olympics was a bold political move to voice 
American opposition to Russia’s strict anti-gay laws, President 
Obama may have missed an opportunity to engage in diplomacy with 
Russia to mend the damage caused by the Snowden saga by not 
personally attending or having a high ranking political figure attend 
the Sochi Winter Olympics.  
Third, failed high profile extradition requests, such as the 
Snowden incident, overshadow the many more successful extradition 
requests between the two nations.
127
 Further, even the successful 
extraditions of Karl Linnas and Feodor Fedorenko are not strong 
indicators that the two countries can work together in present day. 
Both the United States and Russia had an interest in seeing the two 
Nazi war criminals stand trial, so there was little controversy in 
handing over the aforementioned individuals to the Russians. 
However, in the Snowden extradition, the two nations had very 
different interests. The United States had a strong interest in 
receiving and prosecuting Snowden, whereas Russia likely had little 
to gain by agreeing to the extradition.  
 
 125. See Zagaris, Frustrating U.S. Extradition, supra note 5. The Obama administration 
cited “[the] lack of progress on issues such as missile defense and arms control, trade and 
commercial relations, global security issues, and human rights and civil society in the last 
twelve months. . . .” as reasons for cancelling the summit. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 28. The United States has 
deported 627 individuals to Russia from 2002 to 2011, yet the rejected requests for Akhmadov, 
Bout, Alexyseev, and now Snowden overshadow the successful diplomacy between the two 
nations. 
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Fourth, corruption within Russia’s police force128 presents a major 
obstacle to implementing an effective extradition treaty. Russian 
police routinely accuse citizens of minor infractions in an attempt to 
receive bribes, pressure suspects into giving coerced confessions, and 
falsely arrest citizens just to close cases.
129
 Even more alarming is the 
way that the Kremlin uses the police and legal system to target and 
minimize the efforts of political opponents.
130
 “As Putin himself said, 
police corruption is ‘obvious and well-known to everyone.’”131 This 
widespread corruption within Russia’s legal system likely will pose 
problems for the United States if it decides to enter into an extradition 
treaty with Russia because the United States would be faced with 
Russian extradition requests that were likely made pursuant to 
politically motivated arrests by Russian police. 
Finally, the “maelstrom of events [from the Crimea annexation] 
has made 2014 the worst year for U.S.-Russia relations since the 
Cold War years.”132 The back-and-forth sanctions being levied by 
each nation stemming from the Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
from the Magnitsky Act demonstrate that the two nations are not 
currently focused on resolving or repairing their strained relationship.  
Thus, the future seems bleak for positive foreign relations 
between the two nations. Even if the two countries reconsider their 
 
 128. See Glenn Kates, Russia: Police Captain Arrested in Crackdown on Corruption, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/europe/russia-police-
captain-arrested-in-crackdown-on-corruption.html?_r=2&. 
 129. David M. Herszenhorn, Brutality Jolts Russia Into Action on Police, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/europe/russia-jolted-into-action-on-
police-brutality.html. 
 130. See e.g., Alexei Navalny placed under house arrest in Russia, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/alexei-navalny-russia-opposition-
leader-house-arrest for a recent example of what many people perceive as politically motivated 
arrests of Kremlin opponents. Alexei Navalny, who was “once touted as the most potent threat 
to . . . Vladimir Putin to emerge in Russia in recent years,” was detained on house arrest for 
embezzlement charges. Shaun Walker, ‘Putin is destroying Russia. Why base his regime on 
corruption?’ asks Navalny, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2014/oct/17/putin-is-destroying-russia-why-base-his-regime-on-corruption-asks-navalny. 
Navalny denies the charges and has asserted that the evidence overwhelmingly indicates he is 
innocent. Id. 
 131. Sean Guillory, Corruption, Not Migrants, Is Russia’s Problem, THE NATION (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/175815/corruption-not-migrants-russias-problem#.  
 132. Marina Koren, How 2014 Became the Worst Year in U.S.-Russia Relations Since the 
Cold War, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/how-
2014-became-the-worst-year-in-u-s-russia-relations-since-the-cold-war-20141231. 
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extradition policies, the overall impact that an extradition treaty 
would have on the current relationship is questionable. The United 
States already deports individuals to Russia despite having no 
binding formal treaty,
133
 so it is unclear whether the frequency of 
extraditions or amount of diplomacy would change with the 
introduction of a binding extradition treaty. However, “extradition 
has been largely a foreign relations tool, intended to foster goodwill 
among neighboring nations.”134 “Because the requested and 
requesting participants are [s]tates it is clear that there is a nexus 
between the interests of those respective states and the granting or 
denial of extradition.”135 Thus, if an extradition treaty were 
established, the two countries would likely give greater thought to the 
potential consequences that denying an extradition request would 
have on their relationship and the shared interests the countries 
committed to when signing the extradition treaty in the first place. 
In order to counter the path towards further entrenchment, this 
Note suggests that the two countries draft and implement an 
extradition treaty.
136
 The following is a proposed extradition treaty, 
which is based on other American extradition treaties. 
V. EXTRADITION TREATY PROPOSAL
137
 
The United States of America and the Russian Federation 
(herein “the Signing Parties”), aspiring to engage in better 
cooperation between the two nations for the bilateral 
 
 133. See YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 28. 
 134. Hafen, supra note 27, at 192. 
 135. Id. (quoting Professor Bassiouni). 
 136. See Larissa C. Earl, Note, Loosening Organized Crime’s Stranglehold On the Russian 
Economy: Current Efforts and Suggested Strategies, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 99, 115–17 
(1999) (suggesting that an extradition treaty between the United States and Russia could help 
curb the spread of organized crime emanating from Russia). 
 137. The contents of this proposed treaty are based upon other American extradition 
treaties. It is, however, an incomplete example of how an American-Russian treaty would look, 
given that no Russian extradition treaties were considered out of language limitations. Further, 
the proposed extradition treaty will only discuss certain sections of typical extradition treaties. 
The author chose to discuss treaty sections that are especially relevant to the American-Russian 
relationship moving forward. There are many other sections common in other American 
extradition treaties that will not be discussed in this Note. 
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extradition of criminals or wanted fugitives, agree to the 
following:
138
  
ARTICLE I. Agreement to be Bound 
Each Signing Party agrees to extradite persons charged or 
convicted of any offenses enumerated in Article II of this 
Treaty by the other Signing Party found in its jurisdiction per 
the procedures found in Article III.
139
 
ARTICLE II. Extraditable Offenses
140
 
 Extraditable offenses shall include any offense punishable 
as a felony, or any offense equal to a felony under United 
States federal law, under the laws of both Signing Parties. 
When the punishable offense is not a felony under one of the 
Signing Party’s statutes, the Signing Party receiving the 
request is not bound to honor the extradition request. 
The first sentence of Article II introduces the dual criminality 
requirement,
141
 which is very important to this treaty given that 
American and Russian laws differ vastly on many issues, including 
gay rights. Further, the inclusion of the dual criminality requirement 
helps push American legal ideologies on Russia in a roundabout 
manner, as Russian extradition requests would be more successful if 
Russian law closely matched American law. 
ARTICLE III. Exceptions to Extradition 
The Signing Parties shall not be bound to extradite an 
individual if the charged offense represents a crime or offense 
of a political character.
142
 The Signing Party receiving the 
 
 138. This language is based on language found in the American-Australian Extradition 
Treaty. Australia International Extradition Treaty with the United States, U.S.-Austl., May 14, 
1974, 27 U.S.T. 957. 
 139. See the American-Canadian Extradition Treaty for language similar to this. Canada 
International Extradition Treaty with the United States, U.S.-Can, Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983. 
 140. For examples of what American extradition treaties normally consider extraditable 
offenses, see the American-Cuban extradition treaty for an exhaustive list of offenses. Treaty 
Between the United States and Cuba for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, U.S.-
Cuba, Apr. 6, 1904, 33 Stat 2265. 
 141. See Hafen, supra note 27 (discussing the dual criminality requirement). 
 142. This sentence is based off the language found in the American-Czechoslovakia 
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extradition request shall have the discretion to determine 
whether or not the crime or offense is of a political 
character.
143
 
When the charged offense is punishable by death under the 
laws of the requesting Signing Party and is not punishable 
under the laws of the receiving Signing Party, the receiving 
Signing Party may recommend to the requesting State that any 
punishment imposed for any of those offenses by a less severe 
punishment.
144
 
The first sentence of Article III embraces the political offender 
exception and is integral to the effectiveness of this proposed treaty. 
Given the widespread concerns surrounding Russia’s police 
corruption and politically motivated arrests, any potential extradition 
treaty between the United States and Russia will contain a clause 
embodying the political offender exception, which states that crimes 
having an identifiable relationship to a political agenda would be 
excluded from the list of extraditable offenses.
145
 
ARTICLE IV. Procedure and Necessary Documentation. 
Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence is found 
sufficient, according to the laws in the territory where the 
person whose extradition is requested is found, either to justify 
his trial or committal for trial if the offense with which he is 
charged or its equivalent had been committed in that territory 
or to prove that he is the identical person convicted by the 
courts of the requesting State.
146
 
 
Extradition Treaty. Treaty Between the U.S. of America and the Czechoslovak Republic of July 
Second 1925, Concerning the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive Criminals, U.S.-Czech, July 2, 
1925, 44 Stat 2367; see also supra note 21 and accompanying texts regarding the political 
offender exception. 
 143. See American-Czechoslovakia Extradition Treaty, supra note 142. While this sentence 
gives much power to the Signing Party receiving the extradition request, it is common language 
found throughout American extradition treaties. See Brazil International Extradition Treaty with 
the United States, U.S.-Braz., June 18, 1962, TIAS 5691; the American-Canadian agreement, 
supra note 139. 
 144. American-Australian Extradition Agreement, supra note 138. 
 145. See Cervasio, supra note 12. 
 146. American-Australian Extradition Agreement, supra note 138. This article is an 
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Article IV’s requirement that the requesting party provide 
sufficient evidence to substantiate its claims against the accused 
individual is related to Article III’s inclusion of a political offender 
exception. Article IV seeks to curb fabricated charges against 
individuals that could be politically motivated, as appears to be the 
case with Alexei Navalny and Ilyas Akhmadov.  
ARTICLE V. Extradition of Nationals 
“Neither Contracting State shall be bound to deliver up its 
own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested 
State shall, if not prevented by the laws of that State, have the 
power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed 
proper to do so.”147 
ARTICLE VI. Prior Extradition Requests Unaffected by this 
Treaty. 
 The effective date of this Treaty shall be the date upon 
which the Signing Parties are bound to follow the provisions of 
this Treaty and extradite individuals to the requesting State. 
Any extradition request sent prior to the effective date of this 
Treaty shall be unaffected by the ratification of this Treaty.
148
 
Implications of this Treaty on Snowden Pre-Asylum 
 
important inclusion given Russia’s history of bringing fabricated charges against individuals 
that they want extradited. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text regarding Russia’s 
insufficient documentation on Ilyas Akhmadov in its extradition request. 
 147. Norway International Extradition Treaty with the United States, U.S.-Nor., June 9, 
1977, 31 U.S.T. 5619. This is a common inclusion in modern American extradition treaties. 
Compare Treaty on extradition, U.S.-Arg. Article III, June 10, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12866 
(stating that nationality cannot be cited as the lone reason to refuse an extradition request), with 
American-Australian Extradition Agreement, supra note 138 at Article V (stating that neither 
party to the treaty are bound to deliver up their citizens unless the head of state believes it to be 
the proper action); Treaty Between the United States and Estonia for Extradition of Fugitives 
from Justice, U.S.-Est., Article VIII, Nov. 8, 1924, 43 Stat 1849 (“Under the stipulations of this 
Treaty, neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens.”). 
 148. Such a clause seems necessary to ensure both Signing Parties are aware of the 
temporal restraints of this Treaty. Ensuring that both Signing Parties do not engage in 
retroactive extradition requests seems necessary to keep the two nations from rehashing bitter 
episodes surrounding the extradition requests for Viktor Bout, Ilyas Akhmadov, or Edward 
Snowden. 
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Would this treaty have changed the outcome of the United States’ 
extradition request had the treaty been enacted and in force prior to 
the Snowden saga unfolding? Probably not. 
Snowden was charged pursuant to the 1917 Espionage Act.
149
 
There are two classifications of political offenses, pure and 
relative.
150
 The list of pure political offenses “is limited to 
treason, espionage, and sedition. Pure political offenses are rarely 
extraditable crimes.”151 Given that one of Snowden’s alleged crimes 
is espionage, it is unlikely that Russia would have honored the United 
States’ request for Snowden had the proposed treaty been in force. 
Further, the complaint also charged Snowden with theft.
152
 Theft is a 
common crime connected with a political act, and thus may qualify 
for the political offense exception.”153  
Given that both categories of offenses the United States charged 
Snowden with (theft and espionage) fall under the political offender 
exception, it is unlikely that Russia would extradite him upon 
Washington’s request. Additionally, the many recent rejections of 
high profile extradition requests from Russia weigh against Russia 
extraditing Snowden. Thus, Snowden likely would have received 
asylum even if the proposed extradition treaty was in force. However, 
despite the likelihood that Snowden would have been granted asylum 
even if Russia were bound to follow the aforementioned treaty, the 
proposed treaty still could have been beneficial at the time for two 
reasons.  
First, the proposed treaty establishes a set of rules and procedures 
that would have been followed when the two nations discussed 
Snowden’s situation. These established rules may have diminished 
the impact that the years of animosity between the two nations might 
have had on the dialogue, as they would be bound to follow a set 
procedure instead of following history. Thus, the final decision to 
grant Snowden asylum would have been fueled not by animosity but 
by defined sections of the proposed treaty. Second, as the two nations 
 
 149. Finn, supra note 1. 
 150. Littenberg, supra note 21, at 1198. 
 151. Id. at 1198–99. 
 152. Finn, supra note 1. 
 153. Littenberg, supra note 21, at 1199. 
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would have already met and drafted the proposed treaty, they would 
have already opened lines of communication and established a 
meeting of the minds on this issue. Thus, the soured relationship 
could be improved via the drafting and implementation process of the 
proposed treaty. And, both of the aforementioned benefits would also 
apply prospectively for any extradition treaty that the two nations 
might eventually draft.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Snowden saga provides an optimal opportunity for the United 
States and Russia to reevaluate their position on a formal extradition 
agreement. “On several occasions in recent years senior Russian 
officials have called on Washington to revive a bilateral extradition 
treaty” in response to the United States imprisoning Russian citizens 
in America, notably Viktor Bout.
154
 The United States, however, has 
let these proposals fall on deaf ears.
155
 Perhaps the failed extradition 
request of Edward Snowden will cause the United States to engage in 
meaningful dialogue with Russia. However, as discussed, there are 
many obstacles standing in the way of reaching a friendly 
relationship with the Russian Federation. A formal extradition treaty 
between the two rivals could serve as the first step toward engaging 
in friendlier dialogue and serve to keep the two countries from 
becoming further entrenched and snowed in.  
 
 154. Schreck, supra note 32. Russian Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov stated, “We 
raised these issues more than two years ago, during the first visit of a justice ministry’s 
delegation to the United States. So far, frankly speaking, the United States side remains 
reluctant to accept our proposals.” Id. 
 155. See id. 
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